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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Case No. 920399 
ETHEL SAWYERS ASHWORTH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHN W. BETTERIDGE and 
GEORGE G. BETTERIDGE, 
Defendants and Appellees 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Rules 3(a) and 42, Utah R. App. P. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUES 
1. Whether Plaintiff should be required to repay 
$5,170.51 with interest to Defendants1 insurance carrier, Allstate 
Insurance Company, as a condition of being able to assert her tort 
claim against Defendants. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Plaintiff appeals the order dismissing her Complaint 
with prejudice which dismissal Mis appropriate only where it 
clearly appears that the plaintiff or plaintiffs would not be 
entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any state of 
facts they could prove to support their claim. Colman v. Utah 
State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). In determining 
whether the trial court properly granted the motion, we must accept 
the factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hospital, 160 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (May 6, 1991)." Prows 
v. State of Utah, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND RULE CONSTRUCTION 
THOUGHT TO BE DETERMINATIVE OF ISSUES 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought a tort action for personal injury 
against defendants. (R.2,3) Defendants filed a motion for summary 
judgment based on accord and satisfaction (R.8-17) which ultimately 
resulted in an order requiring Plaintiff to repay money advanced 
by defendants' insurance carrier as a condition of maintaining her 
tort action. (R.78-80) Plaintiff was financially unable to do so 
and her complaint was dismissed with prejudice. (R.84,85) This 
appeal followed. (R.90) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 25, 1988, Plaintiff was lawfully parked in her 
motor vehicle in front of Hillcrest High School when Defendant John 
W. Betteridge, age 16, drove out of a fenced area of the school, 
made an improper right turn and crashed his jeep into Plaintiff's 
parked motor vehicle. (R. 68/ 69) 
Defendant George G. Betteridge was the father of 
Defendant John W. Betteridge and signed his application for a 
driving license and is jointly and severally liable with Defendant 
John W. Betteridge for the injuries and damages sustained by 
Plaintiff pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-115. (R. 2) Defendant 
George G. Betteridge was the owner of a motor vehicle which he gave 
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and furnished to Defendant John W. Betteridge knowing that the said 
Defendant John W. Betteridge would operate said motor vehicle on 
the highways of the State of Utah and Defendant George G. 
Betteridge is jointly and severally liable with Defendant John W. 
Betteridge for the injuries sustained by Plaintiff pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-2-116. (R. 2, 3) 
Plaintiff saw several health care professionals from the 
date of the accident to January 5, 1990 and incurred $3,262.39 for 
medical expenses. (R. 19, 46) Defendants' own doctor, Nathaniel 
Nord, M.D., found a causal connection between Plaintiff's injuries 
and the automobile accident out of which this action arises as a 
result of the negligence of Defendants. (R. 50-55, 54, 64) 
Defendants were insured by Allstate Insurance Company 
and an Allstate adjuster, Andra Hogan, and Plaintiff had 
discussions about a settlement in the case. (R. 18, 19, 21-23) 
Defendants' adjuster contends an agreement was reached to settle 
the case for $4,500.00 plus additional medical expense of $670.51 
or a total of $5,170.51. (R. 18, 19) Plaintiff was given a draft 
for the said sum and cashed the same. (R. 19) Defendants' 
adjuster gave Plaintiff a blank Allstate Insurance Company "Release 
of All Claims" (R. 24) and told her to sign and return the 
release. (R. 18, 19) 
Plaintiff contends she did not enter into a settlement 
agreement because she was still having problems with her cervical 
area, left shoulder and right hand and that Defendants' adjuster 
to her that if the $5,170.51 was a satisfactory settlement then she 
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was to sign and return the "Release of All Claims." (R. 21-24) 
Plaintiff made five or six visits to a health care professional 
thereafter, (R. 22) 
On October 16, 1990, Dan Filler, Unit Claim Manager of 
Allstate, wrote a letter to Plaintiff which stated as follows: 
Dear Ms. Sawyers, 
Per our discussion of today, October 15, 1990, 
Allstate has not received the Release of All 
Claims which was sent to you with our check in 
the amount of $5,170.51 on January 5th, 1990. 
As our settlement check has been cashed, 
failure to hear from you will result in the 
assumption you are in agreement with the terms 
of the settlement and have accepted our payment 
as full and final settlement of your claim. 
Sincerely, 
Dan Filler 
Unit Claim Manager 
(R. 25) 
Plaintiff then retained counsel and filed suit against 
Defendants. (R. 23) 
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment supported 
by a memorandum against Plaintiff on the grounds that there was an 
accord and satisfaction. (R. 8-17) 
A hearing was held on Defendants1 Motion and the trial 
court ordered two trials, one on the issue of accord and 
satisfaction and if Plaintiff were successful, then a second trial 
on the tort action. In connection with this, Plaintiff was ordered 
to repay the $5,170.51 with interest to Allstate Insurance Company 
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as a condition of being able to proceed with these two trials. (R. 
39, 40) This Order was dated April 15, 1991. (R. 39, 40) 
Plaintiff then filed a Motion for New Trial (R. 41, 42) 
which, in fact, was a Motion for "Reconsideration" filed pursuant 
to Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in accordance with State 
Land Corp. v. Patterson, 797 P.2d 1101 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), and 
Memoranda was submitted to the court (R. 43-69) and the matter was 
argued resulting in the "Order Denying Motion for New Trial and 
Clarification of Order of April 15, 1991." (R. 78-80) 
This Order eliminated the trial concerning whether there 
was an accord and satisfaction, apparently ruling as a matter of 
law that there was no accord and satisfaction, but in order to set 
aside the "purported settlement" Plaintiff must pay $5,170.51 with 
interest to Allstate Insurance Company in order to proceed with her 
tort action against the Defendants. (R. 78-80) 
Plaintiff filed an affidavit stating that she had not 
settled her case with Defendants or Allstate Insurance Company and 
that she was financially unable to repay the $5,170.51 with 
interest to Allstate Insurance Company. (R. 70) An order was 
entered dismissing Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice (R. 84, 85) 
and she filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 90) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The lower court made no findings that there was an accord 
and satisfaction between plaintiff and defendants. The $5,170.51 
with interest ordered to be repaid by Plaintiff represents only 
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approximately one-half of what she is entitled to on a settlement 
basis from Defendants. There are no equitable principles requiring 
plaintiff to repay this money to Defendants1 insurance carrier. 
The order of the lower court ordering the repayment of this money 
as a condition of prosecuting her tort claim is erroneous. 
POINT II 
The order requiring the repayment of $5,170.51 without 
interest by Plaintiff is an unconstitutional bar on her access to 
the court to prosecute her claim. Repayment of the money is 
contrary to the established judicial policy of the State of Utah 




PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO REPAY $5,170.51 WITH INTEREST 
TO DEFENDANTS' INSURANCE CARRIER, ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, AS 
A CONDITION OF BEING ABLE TO ASSERT HER TORT CLAIM AGAINST 
DEFENDANTS. 
A. Analysis of lower court orders of April 15, 1991 
(R. 39, 40) and August 15, 1991 (R. 78-80). 
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Order April 15th, ordered a 
separate trial on the issue of accord and satisfaction as between 
Plaintiff and Defendants and if Plaintiff was successful, a second 
trial on the tort action. (R. 40) 
A rehearing was held resulting in the order drafted by 
Judge Daniels of August 15, 1991 (R. 78-80) rescinding paragraphs 
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3 and 4 of the April 15th order and ordering as follows: 
The intention of the Court was not to allow a 
new trial on the issue of accord and 
satisfaction, but allowed the Plaintiff the 
option of setting aside the purported 
settlement, and proceeding with trial on the 
merits. A condition of setting the purported 
settlement aside, however, is repayment of the 
amount of settlement. 
If, as a matter of law, there was an accord and 
satisfaction between Plaintiff and Defendants, Defendants1 original 
Motion for Summary Judgment should have been granted. Blackhurst 
v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688 (Utah 1985); Lawrence 
Construction Co. v. Holmquist, 642 P.2d 382 (Utah 1982). 
The lower court did not take this position in either 
order. It first ordered a separate trial on the accord and 
satisfaction and then allowed the "purported agreement" to be set 
aside on the condition that $5,170.51 be repaid. 
It is submitted that Plaintiff's two affidavits, the 
failure to obtain Plaintiff's signature on the "Release of All 
Claims" and the letter of the Allstate Claims Manager impelled the 
court to conclude as a matter of law that there was not an accord 
and satisfaction as between the parties; and further, that the 
issue and evidence of accord and satisfaction was insufficient to 
warrant a trial. 
B. Restitution of the $5,170.51 with interest to 
Allstate. 
The $5,170.51 represented by the draft given to Plaintiff 
consisted of $4,500.00 for the injury settlement and the $670.51 
for Plaintifffs additional medical expense. Allstate had 
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previously paid the sum of $3,262.39 to Plaintiff's health care 
providers which together with the $670.51 paid as part of the 
purported settlement adds up to total medical expenses of 
$3,932.90. 
Prior to the purported accord and satisfaction, 
Defendants' insurer, Allstate, had Plaintiff examined by Nathaniel 
M. Nord, M.D., and on December 18, 1989, Dr. Nord found a causal 
connection between Plaintiff's injury and the automobile accident 
out of which this action arises involving Defendant's negligence. 
(R. 64) 
Liability could not under any circumstances be disputed 
in good faith. See the Investigating Officer's Report and the 
"Data Code Explanation Sheet." (R. 68, 69) Plaintiff was lawfully 
parked at Hillcrest High School when Defendant John W. Betteridge, 
age 16, drove out of a fenced area at the school, made an improper 
right hand turn, and crashed his Jeep into Plaintiff's parked 
automobile. The investigating officer indicated no fault on the 
part of Plaintiff. 
A minimum settlement of Plaintiff's causally connected 
injury is three (3) times the medical expense or $11,798.70. This 
proposition is usual, customary, notorious and widely known in the 
territorial jurisdiction of this Court by the insurance company 
adjusters, the legal community handling personal injury cases and 
the judiciary. 
Plaintiff should have been given a minimum settlement of 
$11,798.70 of which $5,170.51 or $4,500.00 with interest would have 
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been part. 
The necessity for restitution under a "purported" accord 
and satisfaction is discussed in 1 C.J.S., Accord and Satisfaction, 
§ 70, p. 568 as follows: 
"However, restitution is not a condition 
precedent where plaintiff is in any event 
entitled to the amount received by him, the 
amount received does not exceed that which is 
admitted or conceded to be due 
plaintiff. .. .plaintiff does not rely on a 
rescission of an accord and satisfaction but 
claims that there was no accord...." 
In the case of Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. 
Ins. Under., 16 Utah 2nd 211, 398 P.2d 685 (1965), Plaintiff 
attempted to set aside a settlement and release given for the sum 
of $12,609.39. A Summary Judgment for Defendant was reversed on 
appeal and the Utah Supreme Court held as follows at 398 P.2d 685: 
"The defendants also raise the objection to 
plaintiff's suit that it should have returned 
or tendered the $12,609.39 as a condition 
precedent to seeking rescission of the 
settlement. One pertinent observation of this 
point is that it has been held, and properly 
so, that where a release of a claim has been 
obtained by fraud, a return or tender of the 
consideration paid therefor is not a necessary 
condition precedent to disaffirmance of the 
release and enforcement of the claim." 
In the annotation at 134 ALR 6, 91, it is stated as 
follows: 
"Somewhat analogous to the situation presented 
by the cases discussed supra, III a 7, is that 
presented where in an action for damages for 
personal injuries the defendant pleads a 
release or compromise agreement executed by 
plaintiff and alleged to represent a settlement 
of any claim held by plaintiff against 
defendant, and the plaintiff alleges that, as 
a matter of fact, no settlement of the kind in 
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question was ever arranged by the parties. 
There are a number of cases involving this 
situation in which the view is taken that even 
though it appeared that money or property was 
turned over to the holder of the claim for 
personal injuries, no return or tender back of 
such money or property was necessary as a 
condition to the enforcement of the original 
claim if it further appeared that, as a matter 
of fact, no settlement was actually negotiated 
by the parties." 
In the case of Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building 
& Loan Ass'n, 94 Utah 97, 75 P.2d 669 (1938), the Utah Supreme 
Court held as follows at 75 P.2d 680: 
"Let it be assumed that there was an accord and 
satisfaction effectuated by reason of the 
surrender and cancellation of the certificate, 
as defendant contends there was, it would not 
be necessary for the plaintiff to restore the 
money already received before it could bring 
the present action. 'Restitution is not a 
condition precedent where plaintiff is in any 
event entitled to the amount received by him 
or the amount received does not exceed that 
which is admitted or conceded to be due 
plaintiff. 
Moreover, in the case of Coke v. Timby, 57 Utah 53, 192 
P.624 (1920), the Supreme Court also held as follows at 192 P.626: 
"Stress laid upon the fact that the court did 
not require the plaintiff to leave with the 
clerk the $200.00 paid by the defendant to 
plaintiff for the so-called release and 
settlement of her claim, which money was 
tendered to the defendant in open court and by 
him refused. In the case of Miller v. Spokane 
Int. Ry. Co., 82 Wash. 170, 143 Pac. 981, the 
third defense was that the damages had been 
settled by the payment, acceptance, and 
retention of $138.00. The respondent replied 
that he was a foreigner, unable to read or 
write English, and that, if he had signed the 
release, he did not know what he was signing. 
The court held it was not necessary to return 
the $138.00 before commencing the action. It, 
however, should have been credited upon the 
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judgment. It was not intended as a gift, and 
did not operate as a settlement." 
Assuming that Plaintiff repays the $5,170.51 with 
interest to Allstate and a trial is held and a judgment entered or 
a settlement reached for a sum in excess of the $5,170.51, Allstate 
would have to repay to plaintiff as part of the judgment or 
settlement the same money that she is now ordered to repay to them. 
This contingency was also discussed in Reliable Furniture 
Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Under, supra, at 398 P.2d 687: 
"Even more fundamental on this point is a 
reflection upon the fact that the paramount 
objective is always to do justice between these 
parties. Upon the basis of the record thus far 
developed, it appears that the defendant's own 
figures show it owes the plaintiff $12,609.39. 
In the event of further proceedings the 
defendant can be protected by having that 
credit against the amount, if any, in excess 
thereof that may be awarded upon final 
judgment." 
Based on the settlement values of Plaintiff's injury case 
and the foregoing authorities, it was error for the court below to 
order the repayment of $5,170.51 which perhaps should have been 
only $4,500.00 as a condition of bringing her case to trial. 
C. Restitution. 
The order of the court to repay the $5,170.51 to Allstate 
is restitution. The basis for restitution is that a person who is 
unjustly enriched at the expense of another should be required to 
make restitution to the said person. Harlin v. Daines, 567 P.2d 
1120 (Utah 1977). 
The Utah Supreme Court observed in L&A Drywall v. 
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Whitmore Constr. Co., 608 P.2d 626 (Utah 1980) as follows at 608 
P.2d 630: 
"Unjust enrichment occurs whenever a person has 
and retains money or benefits which in justice 
and equity belong to another." 
The court below made no findings of any unjust enrichment 
of Plaintiff at the expense of Allstate Insurance Company or how 
justice and equity required the repayment of this large sum of 
money to Defendants1 insurance carrier. 
Plaintiff filed an affidavit stating that she was unable 
to repay the $5,170.51 with interest which would be $5,983.58 with 
interest at 10% per annum to August 1, 1992. 
It is submitted that no equitable principles require 
Plaintiff to repay this money to Allstate. 
POINT II 
THE ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO PAY $5,170.51 WITH INTEREST TO 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY TO PROCEED WITH HER TORT CLAIM AGAINST 
DEFENDANTS VIOLATES THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, § 11. 
The Utah Constitution, Article I, § 11 provides as 
follows: 
"All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this State, 
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party." 
Assuming the order for repayment was discretionary with 
the court below, it is submitted that the following language is 
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applicable from Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601 (Utah 1976) at 546 
P.2d 603: 
"Fundamental to the concept of the rule of law 
is the principle that reason and justice shall 
prevail over the arbitrary and uncontrolled 
will of any one person; and that this applies 
to all men in every status: to courts and 
judges, as well as to autocrats or bureaucrats. 
The meaning of the term "discretion" itself 
imports that the action should be taken within 
reason and good conscience in the interest of 
protecting the rights of both parties and 
serving the ends of justice. It has always 
been the policy of our law to resolve doubts 
in favor of permitting parties to have their 
day in court on the merits of a controversy." 
(Emphasis added) 
It is submitted that the order or repayment by the court 
below is an unconstitutional bar to Plaintiff's prosection of her 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff should not be required to pay any sum of money 
to Allstate Insurance Company as a condition of bringing her tort 
claim to trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Wendell P. Abies 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the l>v ^  day of August, 1992, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant was 
mailed, postage prepaid, to Robert G. Gilchrist, Attorney for 
Defendants and Appellees, 50 South Main Street, Suite 700, Salt 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ETHEL SAWYERS ASHWORTH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN W. BETTERIDGE and 









ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 900906905 
Judge Scott Daniels 
The Court having entered an Order on August 15, 1991, 
in which the Court stated that plaintiff Ethel Sawyers Ashworth 
would be given thirty (30) days to repay to the defendants7 
insurer the sum of $5,170.51 with interest at which time the 
plaintiff would be able to proceed with her tort claim, or in the 
alternative that if the plaintiff did not repay said amount 
within thirty days, that this action would be deemed dismissed 
with prejudice; and the plaintiff having not paid said sum, and 
having filed a Notice of Appeal on September 16, 1991; that based 
upon the foregoing, and it appearing to the Court that the 
plaintiff has not complied with the Court's Order to tender the 
"HOSj 
above-stated sum in the time prescribed by the Court, and the 
Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment, having been 
previously granted, and the plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial 
having been denied, that 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, with each 
party to bear their own costs. 
DATED this 2 > da¥ of V ) fl ^ 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
The Honorable Scott Daniels 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Wendell P. Abies 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Robert G. Gilchrist 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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